Posted: May 25, 2021
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Article SummaryOn May 19, 2021, Maggie Fox of CNN emailed me that she was picking up a topic we had corresponded about months earlier: how best to resuscitate the reputation of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Now that she was finally going to write the article, she wanted to know if I had any new thoughts. Aside from summarizing and quoting our earlier correspondence, my May 20 response focused on CDC’s May 13 announcement that vaccinated people could safely remove their masks and stop social distancing – an announcement that was widely criticized and indisputably did CDC further reputational damage. Though she did mention the May 13 announcement, Maggie’s May 21 article focused more on CDC earlier COVID-19 reputation debacles, and on CDC’s failure to resume its customary role as the nation’s premier source of information about infectious disease outbreaks. Maggie quoted me several times on those topics, but not on the May 13 announcement.

CDC’s Reputation Takes Another Hit When Walensky Says Vaccinated People Can Take Off Their Masks

(Maggie Fox’s article based partly on this email was posted on the CNN website on May 21, 2021.)

It would have been hard for any public health agency to get through what the U.S. has gone through over the past 16 months without ending up less trusted than it started. Just as presidents get too much credit for things that go right and too much blame for things that go wrong, CDC was bound to get more COVID-19 credit and blame than it deserved. In this case, obviously, a lot more things went wrong than right. And CDC played a pretty minor role in the main thing that went right, the development and rollout of vaccines. So CDC was foreordained to look bad about now.

That said, CDC made a lot of mistakes over the past 16 months that you couldn’t miss if you were paying attention. Some mistakes are inevitable when confronting an unprecedented crisis. But a lot of CDC’s biggest COVID-19 mistakes were preventable.

It’s worth noting that most of CDC’s biggest COVID-19 mistakes were communication mistakes, not science mistakes. There’s one important exception, CDC’s botching of test development for the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which kept the U.S. in the dark for crucial weeks last spring as the virus spread. For the most part, though, CDC has continued to do the superb science on which it built its worldwide reputation. But it has pretty consistently failed to explain the science in ways that politicians and citizens could understand. And it has failed to find ways to integrate the science with crucial nonscientific aspects of pandemic policy: the value judgments, the compromises, the political and psychological factors that make scientific truths actionable.

A related and even more important point: Most of CDC’s biggest COVID-19 mistakes cannot be laid at the feet of Donald Trump – or Joe Biden either, for that matter. The mythology is that CDC needs to be kept free from political interference. The Trump administration did occasionally interfere in harmful ways, such as when it tampered with CDC scientific publications. But a far bigger problem than political interference has been CDC’s excessive insulation from the real world of policy-making. Isolated in Atlanta, CDC lacked and continues to lack both in-house political knowhow and good relationships with politically savvy people elsewhere in government.

These defects are on vivid display right now, vis-à-vis CDC’s sudden announcement that fully vaccinated people can safely stop wearing masks and social distancing under most circumstances. I’ll return to that in a minute, after a partial list of CDC’s earlier COVID-19 unforced errors, based largely on the list Jody and I sent you on January 19:

  • For crucial weeks in the spring of 2020, CDC failed to develop a usable test for the virus that causes COVID-19, leaving health departments with no way to track its spread. Worse, CDC kept trying, instead of licensing some other readily available test or pressuring the FDA to relax the rules that kept state and hospital labs from deploying their own tests.
  • Another early mistake: Worried about exacerbating the shortage of surgical and N95 masks for healthcare workers, CDC joined in the false claim (which it knew or should have known was false) that masks were useless to ordinary people. And when CDC finally turned on a dime, lurching from “mask-wearing is foolish and antisocial” to “mask-wearing is essential and obligatory,” it pretended that the turnabout was a response to new data.
  • In past infectious disease outbreaks, CDC was almost always everyone else’s premier source of technical information. Not this time. CDC collected COVID-19 data, but outside nongovernmental sources became and remained more prominent – more comprehensive, more comprehensible, and more highly trusted.

  • The COVID-19 vaccine rollout got off to a rocky start in large measure because of CDC’s excessively complicated, largely ideological, endlessly changing, and hotly debated prioritization categories. Prioritize the elderly because they’re likeliest to die if infected, or the young because they’re likeliest to spread the virus, or essential workers because they’re on the firing line, or people of color because they shouldn’t be neglected yet again? CDC’s shifting counsel on these difficult choices was ultimately ignored by many if not most state governments.

More recently, CDC has staked out a consistently pessimistic stance on most COVID-19 controversies. At the end of March, CDC head Rochelle Walensky inexplicably warned that the country faced “impending doom” if states prematurely lifted COVID-19 restrictions. In April, CDC published summer camp guidelines that seemed excessively restrictive even to most public health professionals (rarely inclined to find any public health guidelines excessively restrictive). When CDC very belatedly relaxed outdoor mask guidelines (except for kids), it pointed out that “less than 10 percent” of COVID-19 transmissions occur outdoors – a true but misleading claim since the real number is thought to be closer to 0.1 percent.

More and more commentators began to wonder aloud if CDC’s excessive pessimism might be doing damage – at least three kinds of damage: reinforcing the hyper-caution of those who followed its guidance; damaging its long-term credibility with those who shrugged off its guidance; and slowing the country’s return to a normal way of life and a functioning economy.

And then came the new guidance: that under most circumstances fully vaccinated people can safely take off their masks and stop social distancing. The following are some thoughts I’ve had about the new guidance since the column about it that Jody and I posted on May 16.

The new guidance has been widely criticized. Almost nobody, however, has criticized its science. That is, almost nobody has said that CDC is wrong about the data, that fully vaccinated people are likelier than CDC claims to get sick or make other people sick if they stop taking precautions. So if CDC is supposed to “Do Science,” and leave the politics to politicians, and if the science behind the new guidance is impeccable, why all the criticism?

The switcheroo was too sudden.

The most obvious risk communication mistake – or just plain communication mistake – CDC made was the sudden switcheroo in its recommendations. The evidence had been accumulating for months that the COVID-19 vaccines were miraculously effective in keeping vaccinated people from getting sick or making others sick. Lots of commentators had already argued that the time had come to relax the recommended precautions for the fully vaccinated; not only would doing so be safe, they argued, but it would also give vaccine-hesitant people a powerful new incentive to roll up their sleeves.

CDC could have said, “You’re almost certainly right, but it’s a just a little early. Let’s wait a week or two more, till the case count gets even lower and the evidence gets even stronger.” As far as I know, it said nothing like that – no hints of what was coming. Just a couple of days before announcing the new guidance, in fact, Walensky told Congress that masks and social distancing were crucial. Some media stories say she had already given a tentative signoff to the new guidance when she stoutly defended the about-to-be-abandoned guidance. Certainly she offered no tipoff that a big change was probably coming within days.

If CDC didn’t want to hint that change was in the offing, other government agencies might have done so on its behalf – if they had known. But apparently other agencies and even the White House weren’t apprised, much less consulted. OSHA, for example, was in the middle of figuring out mask requirements for workplaces; it would have appreciated a heads-up, and might have suggested a less abrupt rollout.

Part of the suddenness: The new guidance didn’t have much of the communication apparatus that major government announcements usually have. Where were the background briefings? Why was there no presser in Atlanta to follow up on Walensky’s three-minute announcement at the White House? How come there wasn’t a Q&A ready to hand out?

The change in attitude was shocking – and it wasn’t said explicitly enough so it could be defended.

Before there were magnificently effective COVID-19 vaccines, “We’re all in this together” was a crucial pandemic message. The need to protect each other was at the heart of masks, social distancing, and other so-called “non-pharmaceutical interventions.” Though this explicitly communitarian message predated the Biden presidency, it was endlessly echoed by the new president. COVID-19 precautions weren’t only or even mostly things we were doing for ourselves; they were things we were doing for each other, and for our country.

Now, suddenly, CDC was dividing the U.S. population into two cohorts: the vaccinated and the unvaccinated. This dichotomy ignored the inadequately vaccinated, immunocompromised people whose vaccines leave them significantly less protected than other vaccinated people. But the more fundamental shift is the dichotomy itself. By almost all accounts the dichotomy is scientifically sound. The unvaccinated are a tiny threat to the vaccinated. The vaccinated are a tiny threat to the unvaccinated. The unvaccinated significantly threaten only each other. We’re not all in this together anymore.

The U.S. has never been as communitarian a country as it might like to be, certainly not as communitarian as many Asian cultures, for example. That’s part of why the U.S. has had such a tough time these past 16 months; individualistic cultures are intrinsically less able to unite to fight a pandemic than communitarian (or authoritarian) cultures. So a shift in CDC rhetoric from the communitarian to the individualistic might have gone down pretty well. But it needed to be explicit, and it needed to be defended. It wasn’t. It certainly wasn’t explicit and defended on the day the new guidance was announced, and for the most part it hasn’t been explicit and defended in the messaging cleanup efforts since then.

number 3

CDC didn’t explain the policy dilemma its new guidance created.

If you’re vaccinated (and your immune system is working properly), you no longer need to wear masks and socially distance in most situations – neither to protect yourself nor to protect others. That’s the key scientific conclusion that CDC was announcing. But unvaccinated people do still need to wear masks and socially distance to protect themselves and others. CDC said that too, though it didn’t underline it enough.

Here’s what CDC didn’t underline at all, and almost seemed not to realize: Since it’s hard to sort the vaccinated from the unvaccinated, it may still make sense to expect or ask or require everyone to wear masks and socially distance, even in situations where the science says vaccinated people could safely not do so.

The new CDC guidance leaves state and local governments, store managements, etc. (even the U.S. House of Representatives) with a dilemma. Or rather a trilemma, with three options:

  • Require vaccinated people to take unnecessary precautions because those precautions are necessary for the unvaccinated (to protect themselves, each other, and the immunocompromised).
  • Leave unvaccinated people free not to take those necessary precautions, which won’t significantly endanger vaccinated people (though it may frighten and anger them) but will lead to increased infections among the unvaccinated and the immunocompromised.
  • Find a way to distinguish vaccinated from unvaccinated people, so you can make the latter but not the former take those precautions (or better yet, get vaccinated so they won’t have to anymore).

CDC should have acknowledged this trilemma, and how daunting it is. Then it would have had a choice. It could have offered recommendations for how best to resolve the trilemma. It might have recommended “vaccine passports,” for example. Or it might have urged a continued communitarian approach despite the science. Or it might have exulted in the new freedom of the vaccinated and urged the unvaccinated to catch up. Or it might have split the baby, recommending one approach when positivity and viral spread are locally high, and a different approach when they’re low. Or it might have suggested that others split the baby; a store, for example, might have “mask required” days and “mask optional” days.

The other choice: CDC could have explicitly disavowed any authority or expertise relevant to this difficult policy trilemma: “The scientific evidence says unvaccinated people need to wear masks and socially distance, but vaccinated people don’t. That’s our call, and we made it. What to do about it is a policy decision that’s beyond our pay grade.”

CDC took neither choice. It basically ignored the policy trilemma.

Some people criticized it for that, rightly so. More people misunderstood (in some cases willfully) what CDC had said. They interpreted CDC as having taken a stance it didn’t take: either that everyone, even the unvaccinated, can safely stop wearing masks and social distancing; or that we can all trust unvaccinated people to keep wearing masks and social distancing.

CDC made neither claim. But the misunderstanding is mostly CDCs fault. (This is a communication truism: The job of communication is to be understood correctly, so all misunderstandings are mostly the source’s fault.) CDC didn’t take a stance on the trilemma. So listeners made up their own minds what CDC’s stance is.

Many critics have willfully compounded the misunderstanding. Expert critics who say “it’s too early to tell people they can take off their masks” rarely say CDC is mistaken that vaccinated people can safely do so. But they intentionally give vaccinated people that impression. They are trying to frighten vaccinated people into continuing to take precautions that vaccinated people no longer need to take. The expert critics rarely explain their real (and defensible) reason, that they don’t want unvaccinated people to take off their masks as well. This is fearmongering. It is dishonest. It creates the misimpression that CDC’s science is wrong. And it leaves the public confused – not by CDC, as they claim, but by them.

number 4

CDC didn’t address COVID-19 polarization and outrage.

Just about everybody has noted that COVID-19 policy isn’t just an awful set of policy challenges with uncertain answers. It is also a polarizing set of controversies that have left virtually all Americans angry and mistrustful. Just about everybody, that is, except CDC, which continues to act and speak as if polarization and outrage were not a factor.

It is clear from the media coverage that many people are experiencing high levels of fear, anger, and mistrust (in a word, outrage) as a result of the new CDC guidance. That makes sense for people who are severely immunocompromised; the new guidance genuinely leaves them in the lurch. But why should successfully vaccinated people respond that way to learning that CDC thinks they have next-to-nothing to fear from unmasked unvaccinated people?

Their reaction reminds me of the way neighbors of a polluting factory react when EPA says the factory’s emissions are extremely unlikely to give them cancer. It’s partly that they don’t trust the assurance; what if CDC/EPA is wrong. But in many cases they don’t want to trust the assurance – they see it as an offense. That’s what happens when people are outraged enough. We cheer news that we are endangered because it validates everything we’re thinking and feeling: our previous beliefs; our anger, fear, and mistrust; our hatred and disdain and virtuous sense of superiority vis-à-vis the “other” (the factory management, the willfully unvaccinated). News that we’re not endangered paradoxically exacerbates our outrage because it invalidates all those thoughts and feelings.

I think that’s largely why so many vaccinated people have misinterpreted CDC as claiming they can trust unvaccinated people to keep wearing their masks and social distancing. The misinterpretation frees them to reject the unwelcome news that they are no longer vulnerable; those horrible unvaccinated people can’t be trusted, so we virtuous vaccinated people are still at risk, even though CDC says we’re not.

CDC should have made it much clearer that it wasn’t claiming we can trust unvaccinated people. It was claiming we don’t have to trust them. (Again, the immunocompromised are an exception; so are children who can’t be vaccinated, though their risk is much lower.) People who weren’t outraged heard this message clearly enough in CDC’s announcement of the new guidance. But outrage made it hard to hear.

In addition to making the message clearer, easier to hear and harder to misinterpret, CDC might have addressed the reasons so many people were having trouble hearing it: “After month after month of fearing each other’s very breath, it’s understandably a major adjustment to learn that if you’re vaccinated, you have almost nothing further to fear from your fellow citizens, whether they’re vaccinated or not, even whether they’re infected or not. And to those of us who are angry at their fellow citizens who resisted vaccination: It may take a while to let go of that anger, now that they’re not a risk to you anymore.”

number 5

CDC didn’t acknowledge that many people will find it difficult to stop taking precautions like masks and social distancing.

There are several reasons why a vaccinated person might decide to continue taking precautions even under circumstances where CDC now says it’s unnecessary. Maybe they doubt CDC’s understanding of the data. Maybe they’re more risk-averse than most people. Maybe they’re more vulnerable than most people (or think they might be). Maybe they want to make common cause with people who can’t stop taking precautions, perhaps their child or an immunocompromised relative. Maybe they want to send a signal to unvaccinated people that they, too, should keep taking precautions.

But the likeliest reason is that it’s just as hard to adapt to the downward arc of a receding crisis as to its upward arc when it first arrived. Just as many people were slow to adopt precautions that are now second nature, many people – and many of the same people – will be slow to abandon those precautions. That’s a natural, predictable, inevitable phenomenon. I have been struck by the extent of people’s self-knowledge about this. Social media content is full of people ruefully saying they’re having trouble adjusting. It would have helped for CDC to validate that.

number 6

CDC didn’t pay enough attention to the people its guidance left in the lurch.

There is zero doubt that some unvaccinated people will abandon masks and social distancing because of the new CDC guidance. Even though the guidance says they shouldn’t, resulting new policies will mean they can. The new guidance will lead other unvaccinated people to decide to get vaccinated. But at least in the short term, various public places will become risker – not meaningfully riskier to successfully vaccinated people, but meaningfully riskier to the unvaccinated and the unsuccessfully vaccinated.

CDC has to have calculated this risk and decided that it is small enough to accept. In most of the U.S., the virus is spreading a lot less right now than it was a few months ago, so the risk is lower than it was. This risk is nonetheless the major downside of the new guidance – and CDC should have acknowledged it. More than acknowledged it: mourned it.

The risk to children who can’t get vaccinated yet is pretty low – though the case for parents policing their children’s masks just got stronger. But the main downside is the risk to severely immunocompromised people, whose vaccinations may have been much less effective than everyone else’s. Their risk will undoubtedly be increased, and their freedom of movement diminished, by the increased number of unmasked people in their midst, people who might or might not be vaccinated.

By not focusing specifically and sadly on this downside, CDC gave many immunocompromised people the impression that it didn’t care about them. Insofar as policy-makers respond to the guidance by loosening mask and social distancing requirements, the guidance did immunocompromised people real harm. By not acknowledging and mourning that harm, CDC added insult to injury.

How to restore trust

There’s more to be said, Maggie, but I’m out of time and steam. I’m belatedly noticing that I didn’t really address the two specifics you mentioned: What should CDC do to restore trust and how important is it that briefings are nearly all at the White House, not at CDC? Sorry about that….

This is what Jody and I said about restoring trust in our January 19 email to you:

In a nutshell, here’s what we think CDC needs to do:

  • Own that it has earned mistrust by mishandling many aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Assert that its principal mistakes were its own, not forced on it by the President or the administration.
  • Tell people what it thinks it did wrong, and invite others to add to the list.
  • Say how sorry it is for these defects in its performance, how many deaths it knows it caused.
  • Diagnose what elements of its culture led to these many mistakes – with an emphasis on too much hubris and too much isolation/autonomy.
  • Prescribe how it thinks it can change to perform better in emergencies to come.
  • Resolve to do better.
  • Propose accountability mechanisms so others can track its improvement (if it improves), and invite suggestions for additional accountability mechanisms.
  • Ask not for renewed trust, but only for a chance to earn back trust – only for a second look, however skeptical it may inevitably be.

The downside of doing this: Millions of people who haven’t been paying much attention and whose trust in CDC is high might overhear portions of our recommended mea culpa. This might lead them to realize for the first time how poorly CDC has performed through the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. There is always this collateral damage when an organization attempts to mend fences with a disillusioned public. The process strips some bystanders of their illusions. Earning back the trust of those who have been paying attention, in other words, endangers the unearned trust of those who haven’t been paying attention.

CDC’s briefing role

And this is what I said about briefings in my February 17 and March 16 emails to you:

Before Biden’s inauguration, a lot of public health professionals said it would be a good idea for CDC to resume its accustomed central role as the key source for media information about infectious disease outbreaks. They predicted – in fact, they virtually demanded – that Anne Schuchat and maybe also Nancy Messonnier be reinstated as top COVID-19 sources.

That didn’t happen. It looked for a week or two like it might be happening. But for the most part it didn’t happen. And I don’t recall seeing many complaints about it (any, in fact) from public health professionals.

Once Biden was in office and had appointed several White House pandemic officials, it became clear that the White House, not CDC, would be the principal locus of media information about the federal COVID-19 response. CDC Director Rochelle Walensky has been fairly visible. The CDC’s experts in infectious diseases, pandemic management, and vaccination under her, not so much.

I don’t especially object to the White House being the dominant source of media information about federal COVID-19 policy – questions like how much stress to put on reopening schools, or what goal to set for daily vaccination totals. Policy questions should be addressed by policy-makers – and that’s the White House, not CDC.

But I would have expected to see a lot more CDC briefings on COVID-19 science – on what precautions are most effective in reducing in-school transmission, for example. And I’d have expected to see more CDC briefings on the sorts of response management coordination issues that CDC has traditionally headed up – what logjams are inhibiting COVID-19 vaccine administration, for example, and what measures might best relieve the logjams.

Maybe President Biden and the White House team figure that CDC’s reputational damage can best be repaired by a period of relative silence, lest it get enmeshed in pandemic-related controversies that it now lacks the stature to settle – and that trying to settle might actually worsen its stature. When I reflect on Dr. Walensky’s efforts to explain and justify the recent CDC back-to-school guidance, I have to admit I see some merit in that argument. The same goes for CDC’s earlier efforts to explain, justify, and walk back the preliminary decision of its Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices that vaccination priorities should rank antiracism ahead of saving the most lives.

Or maybe it’s the other way around, and simpler. Maybe the White House figures the COVID-19 news is good right now (vaccinations up, cases and deaths down) – and wants the benefit of sourcing good news to accrue to the President and his senior advisors, not to CDC….

Under Trump, the White House COVID-19 briefings were far too undisciplined. Under Biden, they feel too disciplined – too structured, too predictable. The Biden team doesn’t make false claims as often or as spectacularly as Trump did. (It’s hard to refer to a “Trump team.”) That’s surely an improvement. What’s unchanged from Trump to Biden: The briefings seem dictated more by the White House political agenda than by new data.

What the CDC failed to do under Trump it is still failing to do under Biden: Give reporters easy, understandable, interactive access to new data and new recommendations based on the data.

Copyright © 2021 by Peter M. Sandman


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